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ABSTRACT
For many years, managers have chosen to ignore the risks associated with acts of terrorism 
that can potentially and catastrophically affect the global supply chain. As producers and 
suppliers become more tightly tied through long term relationships, common communications 
and information technology, events affecting one member of the supply chain can have a 
profound impact on the ability of the rest of the network to operate. The purpose of this 
discourse is to highlight the linkages which leave a supply chain vulnerable in the case of 
direct or indirect disruption caused by unexpected terrorist activity.
Headlines proclaim “Despite Demonstrations 
and Terrorism Fears, Commerce Continues”
(Pope 2000). For how long? What now? Is your 
supply chain vulnerable to disruptions due to 
terrorist activity? What kinds of terrorist 
activities are likely to disrupt supply chain 
operations?
Many in the United States have long considered 
terrorism as something that happens somewhere 
else to someone else. To a great extent that 
belief has been supported. Recent terrorist 
activity in the U.S. has been confined to a few 
high profile cases such as the Atlanta, Oklahoma 
City, and World Trade Center bombings. Many
have chosen to forget the events that occurred 
domestically and world-wide during the Viet 
Nam War. However, Stephen W. Brooks of the 
Treasury Department, a leading expert on anti­
terrorist training and planning, has commented 
that he expects the number of terrorist attacks in 
the U.S. to increase (Fabey 1998). Even more 
frightening is the observation that terrorists can 
take as much time as necessary to determine the 
appropriate target and make plans for the 
attack. Weapons, whether some form of firearm 
or the more difficult to detect biological variety, 
are easily obtained on the street or through the 
Internet.
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According to Brooks, businesses, especially big 
companies doing business with the government, 
have become a primary target. Raids on some 
terrorist groups have revealed plans for attacks 
on ports, rails, and other transportation facilities 
and networks. Such attacks would provide high 
visibility and extensive disruption, furthering the 
objectives of the terrorist group. The reality of 
such threats prompted President Clinton to 
declare war on terrorism. The maritime 
community, with a long history of dealing with 
terrorist activity in the form of pirates, hijackers, 
and smugglers, has expressed a growing concern 
that it is only a matter of time before a port, ship, 
or related facility becomes a target of a terrorist 
attack.
In view of the mounting level of concern 
regarding the potential for disruption of private 
and business activity by terrorist activity, the 
question that may be asked is whether reality 
supports that concern (Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 1999). During the years 1994 through
1999, statistics substantiate the concerns 
expressed regarding terrorist activity (Table 1).
A review of these statistics reveals that 
businesses, targeted 1,589 times during this five- 
year period, are subject to terrorist attacks in far 
greater numbers than any other category.
While there are undoubtedly many explanations 
for the targeting of any given business, the 
question for transportation and logistics 
professionals is, “What effect will this have on 
my company as we seek to meet strategic and 
customer service objectives,” followed closely by, 
“What can be done to reduce the potential 
vulnerability in the supply chain?”
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In an attempt to develop an understanding of the 
potential points of vulnerability in the supply 
chain it is necessary to examine both the 
logistical functions within the firm and
TABLE 1
TOTAL FACILITIES STRUCK BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS:
1994-1999
Year Business Diplomatic Government Military Other
1994 130 24 27 5 126
1995 338 22 20 4 126
1996 236 24 12 6 90
1997 327 30 11 4 80
1998 282 35 10 4 67
1999 276 59 27 17 95
Total 1,589 194 107 40 584
Adapted from:_____, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999,” Department of State
Publication 10678, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, April 2000, Appendix C Statistical Review, p. 104.
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throughout the supply chain. Previous studies 
have investigated various aspects of the supply 
chain related to the most efficient operational 
considerations when moving revenue traffic 
(cargo and passengers). In one such study 
(Cavinato 1992), a model of twenty basic cost and 
value elements is developed which are used to 
define ten key strategic and management areas. 
Yet, not a single element in the list of twenty cost 
and value elements or the list of ten key strategic 
and management areas refers to the enormous 
costs, financial and human, that could result 
from terrorist activities directed toward the firm 
or the environment in which it operates.
A study conducted by Hsu and El-Najdawi (1991) 
examined the safety stock/lot sizing relationship. 
Results indicated that total production costs were 
determined by the number of set-ups, inventories 
carried, and the frequency of shortages that were 
the result of the lot size/safety stock relationship. 
Though it represents a fairly definitive study of 
four safety stock policies, it provides no reference 
to the implications of terrorism on safety stock 
policy decision making.
Modal selection and carrier choice criteria were 
the objectives of a study by Foster and Strasser 
(1990). Variables such as costs, transit time, 
negotiable rates, negotiable service, reliability, 
frequency of service, claims settlement, 
equipment availability, electronic data 
processing, quality of sales personnel, and 
warehousing capabilities were elements of 
importance to both carriers and shippers. 
However, elements such as vulnerability to 
terrorist activity were not mentioned by either 
carriers or shippers as being a consideration in 
the selection of carrier or mode. In a related 
study, the selection of mode and port for 
international logistics was investigated. Neither 
vulnerability to terrorist activity nor contingency 
alternatives to continue port activities were 
mentioned as selection criteria (Min and Galle 
1996).
The examination of routing and scheduling by 
Ronald Ballou (1990) did not take into 
consideration the effects of extraneous elements
such as the probability of terrorist disruption. 
Instead the emphasis was restricted to the 
minimization of miles traveled and vehicles used 
when developing a methodology for routing and 
scheduling.
Kathleen Allen (1991) examined the role of 
logistics in the overseas plant selection process. 
This study examined the importance of corporate 
and/or environmental characteristics in execu­
tive’s perceptions of the importance of logistics as 
overseas production facility acquisition was 
considered. While factors such as product type, 
revenue size, number of overseas production 
facilities, technological production sophistication, 
foreign market growth objectives, and the 
relative costs of distribution were considered, the 
probability of terrorist activity was not a factor 
for consideration.
The impact of inventory centralization was 
examined in an effort to determine the need to 
change the number of stocking locations based on 
the nature and magnitude of the uncertainty 
with which a firm is faced (Tallon 1993). 
Uncertainty in this research is restricted to 
demand uncertainty. No consideration is given 
to the need to reduce the uncertainty resulting 
from the probability of terrorist activity.
The importance of developing close vendor ties 
for the successful implementation of integrated 
logistics management and just-in-time inventory 
systems was the subject of a study by Thomas 
Harrington, et. al. (1991). In this study, a 
methodology for the evaluation of vendor 
performance was developed. This tool would be 
used by managers to formally evaluate vendors 
for the purpose of determining the most desirable 
vendors with which to develop long term 
relationships, identifying problems needing 
corrective action, and gaining productivity 
improvements. None of the criteria identified 
related to the impact of terrorist targeting of the 
supplier and/or its operating environment.
In addition to studies of the individual elements 
of logistics activity, studies of international 
logistics management such as that by Morgan
Spring 2000 59
and Arnold (1991) have been conducted. 
Terrorism is not a topic of consideration in 
overall studies just as it has not been considered 
in studies focusing on individual elements of the 
logistics activity.
IMPACT ON SUPPLY CHAIN 
DESIGN AND COMPOSITION
No matter the product category, size, country of 
origin, or any number of other factors, firms of all 
descriptions are reaching out to markets in all 
parts of the world. As they reach into these 
arenas, the strength and reliability of the supply 
chain becomes of exponential importance. From 
Alexander the Great to Amazon.com, history is 
replete with examples of the impact of supply 
chain operations on the ability to accomplish 
planned strategic objectives.
Location
Location is a major element of supply chain 
design. From the determination of production 
facility and warehouse/distribution center 
location for maximum market coverage by 
shippers, to the determination of the most 
efficient location of terminal facilities and most 
direct route by carriers, location has always been 
one of the most important factors in the decision. 
Location is also an identifiable indicator of the 
probability of terrorist activity (Table 2).
From this table it can be seen that terrorist 
attacks are a fact of life in most parts of the 
world. It is important to remember that, like a 
stone tossed into a quiet lake, each attack creates 
a pattern of disruption that continues to be an 
issue even after the initial event. These
TABLE 2
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS BY REGION
1994 - 1999








1994 25 24 11 58 116 0 88
1995 10 16 29 5 45 0 272
1996 11 11 24 84 45 0 121
1997 11 21 42 128 37 13 52
1998 21 49 14 111 31 0 48
1999 52 72 35 121 25 2 85
Total 130 193 131 594 299 15 666
Adapted from:_____, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999,” Department of State
Publication 10678, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, April 2000, Appendix C Statistical Review, p. 102.
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disruptions are related to the actual destruction 
of facilities and infrastructure as well as the 
continued fear of further attack which affects the 
behavior of those involved.
When taking an integrated supply chain 
perspective, location becomes even more of an 
issue. No longer is the element of risk restricted 
to the facilities and personnel under the direct 
control of the company. From the shipper’s 
perspective, locational risk considerations 
include the location of suppliers (first, second, 
and even third tier), inventory storage and 
distribution center placement, carriers and 
carrier routes selection, and customer location.
Contingency Planning
Managers at all levels of the supply chain must 
face the reality of terrorist activity and its 
potential impact on supply chain operations. 
Partner selection must include an evaluation of 
the ability of that partner to perform, even in the 
event of terrorist generated disruption, just as 
they are expected to perform in the event of 
natural disasters and other unplanned events. 
However, unlike a natural disaster in which 
those affected are simply a matter of chance, 
terrorist activity is often specifically targeted 
(Table 3). This means that several links in the 
supply chain may be affected simultaneously, 
either directly as a result of the actual event, or 
indirectly as a result of facility/infrastructure 
destruction, or human casualties (Table 4).
The development of contingency plans is the 
responsibility of all members of the supply chain. 
Because of the need for integration, these plans 
must not only cover all aspects of firm operations 
communication links between the individual 
members. Just as the growth of ERP programs 
purports to more tightly tie supply chain 
members into an integrated information 
network, the vulnerability of all members of that 
network to IT sabotage is increased.
TABLE 3
ANTI-U.S. TERRORIST 
ATTACKS BY REGION 
1999











Adapted from:_____, “Patterns of
Global Terrorism 1999,” Department 
of State Publication 10678, Office of 
the Secretary of State, Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 
April 2000, Appendix C Statistical 
Review, p. 106.
Note: Includes attacks against U.S. 
facilities and attacks in which 
U.S. citizens suffered 
casualties.
Impact of the Internet
The increased use of the Internet for commerce, 
whether consumer or business oriented, has had 
a tremendous impact on affected firms. Just as 
firms developed the logistics techniques 
necessary to implement JIT strategies, they must
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TABLE 4
U.S. CASUALTIES INCURRED IN 
ANTI-U.S. TERRORIST ATTACKS 
1999








Adapted from:_____, “Patterns of
Global Terrorism 1999,” Department 
of State Publication 10678, Office of 
the Secretary of State, Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 
April 2000, Appendix C Statistical 
Review, p. 106.
Note: Includes attacks against U.S. 
facilities and attacks in which 
U.S. citizens suffered 
casualties.
now further refine those techniques to respond to 
an Internet-based operating environment. To be 
specific, JIT requirements of smaller, more 
frequent deliveries and shipments, have now 
become requirements for faster deliveries and 
shipments at the single-item level on a world­
wide basis. This has entailed the development of 
multiple channels using carriers capable of 
handling smaller sized shipments with a global 
reach.
To accomplish this herculean task, carriers have 
formed international alliances, made increased 
investments in information technology, increased
their use of the communication potential of the 
Web, and made greater use of faster 
transportation modes—specifically air. As 
shipments get smaller, and increased use is 
made of small package carriers, security becomes 
more of an issue. At this time, small package 
carriers are caught between the need to maintain 
shipper privacy and the need to provide security 
for individual shipments and for their facilities 
and personnel in the aggregate. In fact, most 
small package carriers, particularly the USPS, 
require a search warrant before packages can be 
opened by law enforcement officials (Brooks 
2000).
Another factor to be considered is that, if security 
is a responsibility of the shipper, many of the 
small “dot corn’s” and other firms using the 
Internet as a mechanism to reach a global 
market are unaware of the scope of such an 
undertaking and/or do not have the financial 
resources to accomplish the task. If security, of 
both the package and the contents is the respon­
sibility of the carrier, then the carrier’s personnel 
are converted into some type of unofficial 
enforcement army which would be an 
unacceptable situation. Couple this with the 
incredible number of small packages handled on 
an hourly basis, and the potential for terrorist 
penetration is greatly increased.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS
The need for supply chains having the greatest 
potential to operate even in the event of 
unexpected terrorist activity directed toward the 
shipper, carrier, customer, or the operating 
environment is the responsibility of all parties 
involved. While the specific methods chosc-n by 
any individual entity may differ, the objectives 
must remain the same—to deliver the quality of 
product and performance that meets customer 
needs and company objectives. In order to 
accomplish these objectives, managers must take 
the initiative and scrutinize existing plans and 
processes in an effort to identify and strengthen 
those linkages that are especially vulnerable to 
terrorist disruption.
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Shippers
Over the years, as firms have designed supply 
chains for competitive advantage and increased 
efficiencies, the emphasis has been on decreased 
numbers of suppliers, increased cooperation with 
suppliers on everything from forecasting to 
product development, and decreased inventory 
levels with increased inventory flow at all levels 
of the supple chain. The ultimate objective is to 
deliver the greatest level of customer satisfaction 
in the most efficient and cost effective manner 
possible. The greatest effort has been focused on 
the internal processes and procedures needed to 
facilitate the accomplishment of these goals.
The end result has been supply chains which 
encircle the globe. Suppliers, customers and 
manufacturing and storage/distribution facilities 
have been located to take advantage of reduced 
costs in manufacturing, transportation, and 
inventory carrying costs. Increased use of joint 
purchasing has resulted in reduced costs. All of 
these individual entities are connected with 
information technology links from bar coding to 
track inventory, to Internet ordering, payment, 
tracking and tracing, to ERP systems intended to 
coordinate inventory levels and production rates 
to meet but not exceed customer needs. In order 
to produce this new “lean, mean” supply chain, in 
many cases, redundancy has been rooted out of 
the system.
With the greater global reach and lack of 
redundancy in the system, new criteria must be 
included when making supply chain design 
decisions. New criteria for vendor selection 
must include the ability to operate in the event of 
terrorist activity, location, and the identity of the 
carriers and routes used to transport products. 
Location and safety stock levels are a second area 
of concern. Location decisions must include a 
consideration of the risk factor involved when 
locating facilities, serving customers, and/or 
using vendors who are located in areas subject to 
a higher probability of terrorist disruption. 
When making safety stock decisions, the 
likelihood of supply interruption based on vendor
location and carrier selection and routes must be 
considered. The level of interdependency 
between vendors must be scrutinized. There is 
an increased vulnerability in the event that 
supply is disrupted to all the dependent vendors. 
Therefore, the vulnerability of the common 
supplier to disruptive activity must be assessed. 
All of these factors affect the level of safety stock 
that must be carried.
IT decisions must be made with recognition that 
an intentional corruption of the system can affect 
all elements of the supply chain. A criterion for 
IT system selection, then, should be the ability of 
the system to resist corruption attempts as well 
as the ease with which the results of system 
sabotage can be identified and corrected. As the 
supply chain becomes more IT dependent, the 
question becomes whether it is able to operate 
through an alternative system if necessary.
Carriers
Carriers are faced with their own need to protect 
their ability to operate in the event of terrorist 
disruption. Internal considerations might range 
from supplier selection for items such as tires 
and fuel to the vulnerability of information and 
GPS systems. The location and security of 
terminal facilities is an important consideration 
for personnel, equipment, and cargo in transit.
The decision as to shipper selection is an 
important one. Factors which should come under 
consideration include location of shipper 
facilities, location of the shipper’s customers, and 
the routes that must be taken to serve these 
customers. Just as important is the choice of 
partners in alliances designed to extend 
geographic coverage and service offerings.
Route decisions involve the choice of port, 
terminal, and air facilities in addition to the 
actual road or trackage that might be used. 
Terrorist activity can and has affected the ability 
of carriers to make use of such facilities, thus 
disrupting more than one level in a supply chain 
and/or multiple supply chains.
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CONCLUSIONS
There will always be a question of cost vs. benefit 
when reassessing and redesigning a supply 
chain. The primary emphasis during this process 
is most commonly on cost reduction. However, 
reducing the immediate and long term effects 
that can result from terrorist disruptions does 
not come without costs. Companies pay high 
insurance costs to protect their executives who 
are targets of terrorist kidnapping. There are 
additional costs for body guards, drivers, and 
bullet proof automobiles. The objective is to 
protect that managerial expertise and prevent 
the disruption of operating and strategic 
activities. Insurance costs for facilities and for 
inventory stored in more politically unstable 
locations are substantially higher. How do these 
costs compare to the costs of “bullet proofing” 
systems and facilities? How does the cost of the 
judicious use of built-in redundancy compare to 
the cost of operational disruption and the
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